changes in relative prices or preferences will change in the interaction of individual incentive constraints will change the status of individuals in the existing system under the benefit-sharing. When people find that the rules will change the existing situation to improve themselves or others, they will put in resources was required to renegotiate the existing rules in order to change the old rules, the formation of the new rules. When no one person or organization able to rebuild from the investment of resources to benefit rules, the system will stabilize, that the formation of a balanced system. However, formal rules and informal rules change in different ways, the so-called balanced system can only be a partial equilibrium. With some changes in exogenous factors, such as population growth, product, and relative factor prices, technology and market changes, institutional arrangements, the balance will be some initial shock, then the results will affect the allocation of resources. Because balance is local, so the system is always changing.
first part introduces the rulers of the country of origin and country preferences. Because the law on property rights system arrangement is determined by the political system. The highest political decision-making power with the preferences of the rulers and the utility maximization of property rights largely determine the direction and nature of institutional change. Thus, do not understand the country's characteristics and preferences of the national rulers, they can not explain stability and change of property rights system. And different property rights arrangements and the provisions of the income distribution of different programs, therefore, decided to change the state property system the rulers of the private net benefits will inevitably have a major impact pattern of income distribution, thereby affecting the efficient property rights system choice. The rulers of countries seeking to maximize their own interests in the face when the competition is bound constraints and transaction costs caused by inefficient property rights the key.
l. Alchian, A. and Demsetz, Harold: 795.
in front on the basis of investigation and research, this chapter of the new institutional economics in general to make a general evaluation and that it gives us a little enlightenment.
ll. Coase, R0nald Hf >
Since the economic efficiency associated with different institutional arrangements, to improve the efficiency of institutional arrangements are bound to change. If the first four chapters from an economic efficiency point of view of income distribution theory of static inspection system, then starting from the fifth chapter will be used to study the same dynamic point of view the general theory of institutional change.
Chapter VII Institutional Arrangement and Change Theory Evaluation and Implications
References
However, new institutional economics from the system point of view in the mainstream criticism of neoclassical economics and inheritance made, making the system economic analysis tool only (or primarily) for research resource allocation.
l0-Cheung, Steven NSf ): 49-70.
chapter will relax the assumption of zero income effects, further in-depth study of income distribution conflict on the impact of changes in property rights arrangements, and to use the experience of case verification. Adjustment and changes in property rights, in addition to relative price and personal preferences and other factors, the role of politicians, vested interests and the balance of power between the political contest and other political parameters to a large extent on the property system plays an important change role, and thus will be different degrees of efficiency of resource allocation.
The first part is a general analysis of institutional change of power, the internal mechanism. Institutional change is driven by individual expectations in the existing system to maximize the potential external profits. Only when the potential profits than expected costs, a new institutional arrangements will be innovation. In the process of institutional change, institutional and organizational interaction between the continuous,
abercrombie fitch paris, is the key point of institutional change.
2. Alston, LJ, Eggertss0n, T-and North, DC: L. and Hill, PJ, f : > 6. Barzel, Yorma: Macroec0n0mic Stability Blackwell, 1992.
Chapter VI Property System and Income Distribution
However, net income is expected to exceed the expected costs to institutional change as more optimistic about the motives of the theory of institutional change, it has long been unable to answer this question,
mbt chaussures paris, that an efficient system of property rights since the changes to the allocation of resources to place high value to use, and promote economic growth, then why in real life there are many inefficient property rights arrangements continue to exist? Why people do not choose an effective system of property rights for Ming? Clearly, the institutional arrangements not only with economic efficiency, but also to, and income distribution, since the change of any property rights system would mean rearranging the distribution of income will affect the economic efficiency of different levels. Therefore, in order to better understand the property rights arrangements, property rights associated with change and economic performance of the different levels of behavior is necessary to sign the back of property involved in the political negotiations, income distribution, the details of the conflict of detailed inspection.
second part of the in-depth study of political negotiations with the property rights system in China. Change is both a property rights system within the group between private rights obtained from the adoption of or change the use and configuration of the property rules and habits of the group and into the hall of the negotiation process, but also obtain private rights, government officials, politicians and judges or change between the more formal for the implementation of property laws and administrative rulings and conduct of the lobby and the political negotiation process. Changes in property rights bargaining for political negotiations results not only depends on the competition between vested interests and political forces, but also on the different vested interests in the correlation between wealth (income) distribution, and whether the existing allocation rules integration with their needs. Changes in property rights system of political negotiations, the negotiating parties will maximize their share of total income to influence the final property changes. Everyone has the motivation to change from the pattern of income distribution to get the largest possible share. However, due to exclusive property rights, not all needs can be met. Another good program is difficult to design compensation payments side, it is unlikely to be the result of the political negotiation process, so some clients may see the changes in the proposed system would make their situation worse, some people not be ideal share. Therefore, the configuration of property rights and those arising from changes in the distribution of the controversial issues will inevitably be the motivation, that is, income distribution conflict on the property rights system variable 12
New institutional economics, economic efficiency and income distribution of the relationship between two
Chapter General Theory of Institutional Change
this, how institutional economics analytical tools used to study classical economics and Marx emphasized the theme that influence or determine how the system of income distribution,
abercrombie france, and try to outline how the impact of a system arrangement income distribution, the theoretical framework of Marxist theory to explain the problems encountered and the Chinese economic transition and its changes before and after the pattern of income distribution is the end of this article want to do a try.
second part of the analysis of the specific process of institutional change and market factors affect institutional change. Institutional change is the rules that constitute the institutional framework. The combination of standards and implementation mechanisms by marginal adjustments.
and institutional arrangements impact on income distribution in the main logic of classical economics is not well established trail. This can not be said that the lack of new institutional economics.
First, new institutional economics is to evaluate the contribution of Western economics and its limitations. Succession of new institutional economics is the neo-classical methodology critically on the basis of the outcome of the emergence and development. (1) New methods for the study of classical economics theory provides a system and its changes in the basis of available methodology. (2) new institutional economics, the basic theoretical concepts put forward, that presented the concept of transaction costs and general, for the system and its evolution theory in different fields of research breakthroughs to make a great contribution. (3) hit a new institutional economics to find the core issues of economics - resource allocation problem. System and its change theory, the concept of the aid transaction costs, not only under the condition that the different systems of resource allocation, and to explain the behavior of the process of efficient allocation of resources. As a result, not only economic theory expands the scope of the study, but also realizes shift in the focus of economic theory, so economics as it
9. Cheung, Steven NS.: f 23-42.
still has an important impact. Change the property exist in many competing groups and potential conflicts, changes in property rights system there will be delays.
final analysis, the path dependence of institutional change. The success of institutional change, or the path of institutional change depends on two factors: First, complex market with incomplete information, the second is the system for people in social life brought about by increasing returns. These two factors make the system change Once you embark on a path, it will set the direction of the development in the future be self-reinforcing. When the system found in real life, this effective self-reinforcing mechanism, the system also marks the change itself is increasing the income of people in a broad range occurs, the system has not only been supporting the changes and consolidation, but also in Based on this one closely linked to part of the track along the virtuous circle of development, namely,
abercrombie marseille, the so-called path dependence (Path dependence) track: on the contrary, when the system can not find in real life, the self-reinforcing mechanism, the system has changed over means that people can not generally increase the income, the system Ic live in real life and economic development is not effectively support institutional changes are likely to be invalid or is not conducive towards the direction of maximum output, the results of system changes into a stabilization (Lock-in) of the predicament. Changes in the nature of the system time and historical factors to explain the role of the system evolution. More articles related to topics：
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